(Mal)adaptive Mentalizing in the Cognitive Hierarchy, and Its Link to Paranoia

Abstract

Humans need to be on their toes when interacting with competitive others to avoid being taken advantage of. Too much caution out of context can, however, be detrimental and produce false beliefs of intended harm. Here, we offer a formal account of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind. We simulate agents of different depths of mentalizing within a simple game theoretic paradigm and show how, if aligned well, deep recursive mentalization gives rise to both successful deception as well as reasonable skepticism. However, we also show that if a self is mentalizing too deeply – hyper-mentalizing – false beliefs arise that a partner is trying to trick them maliciously, resulting in a material loss to the self. Importantly, we show that this is only true when hypermentalizing agents believe observed actions are generated intentionally. This theory offers a potential cognitive mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial ideation. Rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may arise from the application of overly strategic thinking to ingenuous behaviour. Author Summary Interacting competitively requires vigilance to avoid deception. However, excessive caution can have adverse effects, stemming from false beliefs of intentional harm. So far there is no formal cognitive account of what may cause this suspiciousness. Here we present an examination of this phenomenon through the lens of Theory of Mind – the cognitive ability to consider the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others. By simulating interacting computer agents we illustrate how well-aligned agents can give rise to successful deception and justified skepticism. Crucially, we also reveal that overly cautious agents develop false beliefs that an ingenuous partner is attempting malicious trickery, leading to tangible losses. As well as formally defining a plausible mechanism for suspiciousness, paranoia, and conspiratorial thinking, our theory indicates that rather than a deficit in Theory of Mind, paranoia may involve an over-application of strategy to genuine behaviour.

Keywords

• theory of mind
• paranoid delusions
• paranoia
• emergence of paranoid behavioir
• computational psychiatry
• computational model
• bayesian brain