Power Allocation Between a Distributed Multistatic Radar Network and a Smart Jammer Based on Non- Cooperative Game Theory

Abstract

For the problem of power allocation between a distributed multistatic radar network and a smart jammer, the application of non-cooperative game theory is employed to address the issue in this paper. Consequently, three scenarios of power allocation games are examined. The first two game scenarios, characterized by information asymmetry, are categorized under the Stackelberg game framework, while the final scenario, with information symmetry, is classified as a non-cooperative game. Through the power allocation analyses of the three game scenarios, it is observed that both the radar system and the jammer possess a first-mover advantage. Additionally, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the games are demonstrated. Based on the best response strategies within the games, three corresponding power allocation game algorithms are proposed. Ultimately, the convergence and performance comparison of the three power allocation game algorithms are validated through simulation experiments.

Keywords

• Radar
• jammer
• power allocation
• game theory
• Nash equilibrium