Managerial incentives and investment efficiency in high technology firms

Abstract

This study explores the effect of the CEO equity incentive on the investment efficiency of high technology firms. Previous studies suggest that the CEO equity incentive is an influential factor in the CEO using discretion for his or her own benefits. Further, high technology firms have not only a highly uncertain information environment, but also a unique corporate life cycle, concentrating on the earlier stages. The frequent adjustment in product designs to meet the market requirement can significantly alter the level of capital investments. Thus, this study hypothesizes that both CEO equity incentive and high technology significantly reduce the investment efficiency of firms because of the high level of information asymmetry. Using a sample of 10,556 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2014 for U.S. public firms, this study provides clinching evidence that both CEO equity incentive and high technology significantly decrease investment efficiency of firms. Further, this study finds that the investment efficiency decreases more in high technology firms with CEO equity incentive. This study contributes to the literature by finding that the CEO equity incentive and high technology firms are significant determinants of investment efficiency owing to the highly uncertain information environment they face.

Keywords

• investment efficiency
• ceo equity incentive
• high technology firms
• corporate life cycle
• information asymmetry