Political analysis of using the EU early warning mechanism by the Sejm and the Senate in the years 2010-2016

Abstract

Main argument raised against EU early warning mechanism is its low utility. Yellow card procedure has been launched three times so far, whereas orange card procedure not even once. This indicates that the potential of political instrument which is early-warning mechanism is not fully explored. Nonetheless after seven years since the Lisbon Treaty came into force we can collect enough data in order to asses not only the mechanism itself but also the influence of this instrument on the national parliament scrutiny and engagement in the EU affairs. The aim of this article is: to research how the Sejm and Senate use the early warning mechanism, describe what is its impact on general competences of the Polish parliament regarding subsidiarity control and to confront this assessment with the activity of other national parliaments. Thus, the author will propose the set of indicators according to which will be possible to evaluate the activity and eventually the effectiveness of national parliaments while using the early warning mechanism. There will be also presented the results of the empirical study measuring the activity of Sejm and Senate in mentioned area in the years 2010-2016.

Keywords

• subsidiarity
• evaluation
• EU' early-warning mechanism
• Sejm and Senate