Kējì Fǎxué Pínglùn (Jun 2006)
從法律觀點談信用卡系統之成本與效益 ― 以澳洲信用卡制度改革為例 The Cost and Efficiency of Credit Card Schemes ― A Comparative Study on the Australian Regulatory Reform for Credit Card
Abstract
隨信用卡使用之廣泛與普及，有關競爭法問題也漸受重視。本文擬就其中與成本定價相關之二大議題進行討論，其一為交換費用（Interchange fees）之制訂與衍生相關競爭法議題，其二為禁止特約商店額外收取信用卡使用費（no surcharge rule）之適法性討論，及其分別對經濟體付款制度之影響。 本文主要以澳洲政府近年來有關信用卡支付系統之改革為主要範本，旁及美國、歐盟等檢討現況，並進一步再就相關問題提出個人分析與評論。交換費用之聯合制訂有其必要性，由廠商分別締約反有礙信用卡作業效率，且對市場競爭無益。但於此前提下，適度管制則有其必要。相關計算應有客觀且公正之計算標準，以避免對發卡機構與信用卡組織過度補償（over-compensate）。同時，相關資訊與定價基準應做適當揭露。就禁止特約商店額外收費之限制而言，此一定價限制可能對消費者付款工具之選擇造成錯誤之價格誘因，除有礙付款市場之有效競爭，造成高成本付款工具之普遍使用，影響付款機制之運作效益外，並形成非信用卡使用者對信用卡使用者之不當補貼，並進而造成零售價格之提高，影響社會整體 利益。 This paper first outlines the Australian recently adopted regulatory framework for credit card scheme, highlighting the growing concerns over the possible anti-competitive effects of the setting of interchange fees and the “no-surcharge rule”.The rate of the interchange fees applied to the credit card use nowadays raises the concerns of overcompensating the financial institution as well as the credit card schemes and also, the “no-surcharge rule” restricted the competition and suppressed price signals that guide the efficient allocation of resources. In my opinion, the interchange fee should be decided at a cost-based benchmark. The cost to be included in calculating the formula should be confined within the related cost of processing and authorizing the transaction, of fraud and of the interest-free period. Furthermore, the regulatory authority should review the setting of the interchange fees regularly and related information should be disclosed to the public in the way that consumers can easily and conveniently access. As to the no-surcharge rule, for consumers, when they purchase with credit cards, they don’t have to bear additional cost, though credit card is among the most expensive payment instruments, but benefit from delayed-payment without interest. On the other hand, the merchants are confronted with the customers’ demand to accept credit card transactions even when VISA and MasterCard charge them high fees for using their services. Nowadays, the merchants don’t have any option but to accept credit card transactions since majority of consumers enjoy the convenience of creditcard payments. Barred by the “no-surcharge” requirement from VISA and MasterCard, will the merchants passively shoulder the high service fee for accepting credit card transaction? Merchants will raise the price of every items slightly just enough to cover their cost without attracting consumers’ complaints. Consequently, the general consumers in the economy bear the credit card transaction cost, resulting in the cross subsidization. By abolishing the no-surcharge rule, merchants have the power to set different rules according to the payment instruments used. With additional fee charged, people will make payment decisions based on the cost and benefit analysis, but not simply using credit card as payment with every transaction. Confronted with downward sloping usage rate, VISA and MasterCard may be motivated to make the credit card scheme more efficient. In long term, the credit card scheme will work in the way that best contributes to the efficiency and competition.
