La estructura básica rawlsiana, la fraternidad y el Principio Aristotélico

Abstract

In this article, we shall develop a re-examination of the Rawlsian idea regarding the basic structure as the primary subject of justice, on the basis of the discussion posed by G.A. Cohen. We will see whether, as a matter of fact, personal decisions can be put beyond the scope of the principles of justice or, in other words, to what extent justice is a purely institutional matter. In order to sketch an always provisional answer to the problem of the subject of justice, we will bring into play the Aristotelian Principle as advanced by Rawls. In keeping with this, we will hold that, if Rawls wants to stick to his orthodox view of the basic structure as the exclusive locus of justice, he must not only drop his claim about fraternity as the expression of the Difference Principle –as demanded by Cohen–, but also his attempt at making justice as fairness compatible with the Aristotelian notion of justice as the avoidance of pleonexia.

Keywords

• Igualitarismo liberal
• justicia
• incentivos
• pleonexia.