Understanding riddah in Islamic jurisprudence: Between textual interpretation and human rights

Abstract

The application of the death penalty for perpetrators of riddah by fuqaha is a problematic violation of human rights. This is because there is no good reason to show that the punishment for riddah is the death penalty. The existence of the hadith which is considered to be the legitimacy of riddah punishment turns out to be very different from the reality of its application in the history of Islamic criminal law. This article aims to answer academic anxiety about the death penalty for perpetrators of riddah as a result of the ijtihad of fuqaha as well as to confirm the construction of its historical reality in state life. This article finds that some verses of the Qur’an and the hadith which are used as legal basis by fuqaha are only understood textually and treated as absolute theological verses and hadiths, but not based on historical evidence. The history of the application of criminal punishment during the time of the Prophet shows that there is no application of the death penalty to the perpetrators of riddah, except riddah which is followed by criminal acts. So it is not solely because of the act of riddah itself, but because of a greater crime against Islam. The implementation of the death penalty for the perpetrators of riddah which is based on textual interpretation of the hadith, thus has the potential to conflict with the principles of human rights and religious freedom which have been regulated in the Qur’an. Contribution: This study enriches perspectives on the meaning of riddah as one of the strategic issues in Islam and shows that a new interpretation of riddah has become an important idea to promote a peaceful and inclusive society and provide access to justice for all.

Keywords

• riddah
• human rights
• islamic criminal law
• death penalty
• islamic jurisprudence
• textual interpretation.