A Comparative Study of Monitoring Financial Behavior Of MPs In Iran, United States of America, England and, France

Abstract

Due to the importance of the principle of oversight in the context of public law, the protection of collective trust in representatives, and the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, it can be stated that oversight of the behavior of members of parliament is a given necessity. Just as oversight of the behavior of other officials in the system is important, the methods of monitoring the conduct of representatives are crucial and play a key role in the effectiveness of the oversight institution. Therefore, lawmakers should pay special attention to this and fulfill this important responsibility by analyzing and introducing these methods. The paper presented here aims to answer the question of what the methods of oversight over the behavior of members of parliament are in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Iran. In this context, these countries employ techniques such as regular and random declarations of interests, restrictions on representatives regarding receiving benefits outside of parliament, and non-financial oversight methods, such as public complaints about violations of rules related to representatives' conduct and managing representatives' interactions with lobbyists, while also considering the dignity and status of the representatives. In our country, legislative bodies should utilize these methods, taking into account the available legal culture, and ultimately be able to present an appropriate model of oversight.

Keywords

• parliamentarians
• conflict of interest
• financial supervision
• non-financial
• supervision of professional behavior of representatives