Random evolution dynamics of miners’ safety behavior based on Moran process

Abstract

In order to study the random evolution trend of miners adopting safe behavior strategies under the condition of limited number of miners. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a Moran process-based safety behavior strategy game model, aiming to explore the favorable conditions for miners to adopt safety behavior strategies. The study found that the smaller the external random interference, the greater the net benefit of adopting a safe behavior strategy, the greater the supervision, the greater the risk cost, the smaller the net benefit of adopting an unsafe behavior strategy, and the smaller the psychological loss. The larger the fixed probability, the more effective the unsafe behavior will be. The research results are verified by numerical analysis, and corresponding management suggestions are proposed for the management and control of miners’ unsafe behavior.

Keywords

• moran process
• stochastic evolutionary game
• miner safety behavior
• numerical analysis
• fixed probability