Theoretical and Applied Economics (Aug 2006)
Economics of Corruption. The Equilibrium, Political and Social Determinations
Abstract
he paper starts, on one hand, from the statement unanimously accepted that corruption exists in all societies, and on the other hand, from the preoccupations existent in the international literature about proving scientifically the models of analysis of corruption and determining on this basis some relevant corruption indicators. In essence, the paper focuses on the sphere of the theoretical preoccupations, trying to offer an interpretation based on extended economic and social analysis, mechanisms that structure and describe a genuine system of the corruption actions. Most frequently, corruption occurs in the common public-private activities and it has determinations in the central or local governmental structures. The binom corruption - anticorruption has its origin in distinct social actions, with different actors and different logic constructions, aiming to destroy or strengthen the systems of public integrity. In the context of the theoretical approaches, this paper presents for exemplification relevant aspects concerning social perception on corruption and comparisons of the situations in Romania with those in Central and Eastern Europe or the states newly admitted into the European Union. The paper aims a new way for approaching the nonlinear relationship between political stability/instability and corruption, as well as its economic effects. An extended space is granted to the model of corruption market and conditions of balance within its framework. As it is conceived, the paper enables the enlargement of the theoretical and empirical researches concerning the corruption phenomena.
