The material foundation of ethics in Hans Jonas and Max Scheller. Two responses to Kant from the 20th century

Abstract

The metaphysical foundation of Hans Jonas’ ethics of responsibility is grounded on certain presuppositions: everything theoretical (founded on the reason or intellect) is considered to be objective, while every content of value (founded on affectivity) is considered to be merely subjective. Taking account of Max Scheler’s critique of these same assumptions in Immanuel Kant’s ethical formalism, it is my purpose to discuss them and to show how they implicitly dismiss the true foundation of morality, which lies in an objective as well as affective knowledge of material value qualities — intentional objects given in acts of feeling (Fühlen).

Keywords

• sentimiento
• valor
• formalismo ético
• ética material
• ética de la responsabilidad
• Jonas
• Scheler
• Kant