Стратегічна панорама (Nov 2022)
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTIMIDATION IN RUSSIA’S POLICY
Abstract
Nuclear weapons play a key role in Russia’s security thinking. Concepts of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation include both doctrinally defined nuclear deterrence and doctrinally indefinite nuclear intimidation. The latter has become a central element of the hybrid war waged by Russia. The failure to achieve the initial goals of Russian large-scale military aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has affected Russia’s nuclear policy. The criteria for the use of nuclear weapons in conventional warfare and the forms of nuclear intimidation have changed. The effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear policy depends on the degree of compliance of its components with established international norms, formed within the framework of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. These norms can be defined as the global nuclear order. Russia’s policy of nuclear intimidation falls out of this order and creates a “nuclear disorder”. Currently, it is losing effectiveness for the Russian leadership, since it is increasingly seen as a “nuclear bluff”. Russia is trying to hide its nuclear intimidation behind the doctrinal provisions of nuclear deterrence, which generally remains effective. In the war against Ukraine, Russia is actively trying to artificially create criteria for the use of nuclear weapons that would formally correspond to the global nuclear order, while leaving room for nuclear intimidation. In particular, this may explain accusations against Ukraine of developing weapons of mass destruction and Russia’s attempts to annex the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories as soon as possible. The creation of a postwar architecture of international security will require bringing Russian nuclear policy to the norms of the global nuclear order.
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