Later Wittgenstein on Understanding as a Matter of Mind

Abstract

“What is understanding” is an important question in Later Wittgenstein's works. To examine what understanding is and his positive discussion of understanding, Wittgenstein first shows what understanding is not. According to him, in common sense, understanding is a special mental state that is the source of correct use. But he believes that understanding is not a matter of the mind. He means that understanding is not a mental experience, not a mental state, not a mental process, not a brain disposition. In this article, I examine Wittgenstein's view of why understanding is none of the three mental things (mental experience, mental state, mental process) mentioned above. Also, I will evaluate Wittgenstein's view and show that it is possible to challenge the claim that understanding is not a mental experience, not a mental state, not a mental process. In other words, I will show that Wittgenstein has failed to show that understanding is not a matter of the mind.

Keywords

• wittgenstein
• understanding
• mental experience
• mental state
• mental process