A Security Enhancement of the Precision Time Protocol Using a Trusted Supervisor Node

Abstract

The Precision Time Protocol (PTP) as described in IEEE 1588–2019 provides a sophisticated mechanism to achieve microsecond or even sub-microsecond synchronization of computer clocks in a well-designed and managed network, therefore meeting the needs of even the most time-sensitive industrial and financial applications. However, PTP is prone to many security threats that impact on a correct clock synchronization, leading to potentially devastating consequences. Here, the most vicious attacks are internal attacks, where a threat actor has full access to the infrastructure including any cryptographic keys used. This paper builds on existing research on the impact of internal attack strategies on PTP networks. It shows limitations of existing security approaches to tackle internal attacks and proposes a new security approach using a trusted supervisor node (TSN), in line with prong D as specified in IEEE 1588–2019. A TSN collects and analyzes delay and offset outputs of monitored slaves, as well as timestamps embedded in PTP synchronization messages, allowing it to detect abnormal patterns that point to an attack. The paper distinguishes between two types of TSN with different capabilities and proposes two different detection algorithms. Experiments show the ability of the proposed method to detect all internal PTP attacks, while outlining its limitations.

Keywords

• cyberattacks
• IEEE 1588
• PTP
• security
• time synchronization protocols