On the Knowledge of My Existence: Towards My Existence as the Adverbial Transcendent/Immanent

Abstract

I exist in the universe in a unique manner. I seem to know this statement to be true. However, even if I did not exist, the human who happens to be me could be living and writing the same statement. Then, do I really know that the statement is true? Do I really have epistemic contact with my existence? The aim of paper is to clearly raise this question and to offer a positive answer. By drawing on the disjunctive theory of perception, I propose the account that my existence can be involved in experience. To consider how my existence can be involved in experience and can be known from within experience, I refer to Wittgenstein, Kuki Shūzō, and Nishida Kitarō, and present the panentheistic view that my actual existence can be a limit of experience, both transcendent of and immanent in experience. This view is made persuasive by understanding the transcendence and immanence of my existence as adverbial. My conclusion is that I do know with certainty that I exist in the universe in a unique manner, and that this knowledge lies beyond Cartesian certainty.

Keywords

• self
• experience
• disjunctivism
• panentheism
• transcendence
• immanence