Power of Purse and Budget Act under the Presidential Government System

Abstract

Turkey has switched from Parliamentary Government System to Presidential Government System virtually with the 10 August 2014 presidential elections, legally and partially with the 16 April 2017 referendum, and officially with the 24 June 2018 presidential elections. Hereafter, in this new system, Central Government Budget Bill and Final Accounts Bill can only be proposed by the President to the Parliament; however interestingly, then these bills are finally approved by the same President after they pass the parliamentary processes. Because the fact that there are nevermore obstacles on the President to be an official political party leader, the system has some potentials to exhibit hazardous effects on the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s power of the purse, on the sovereignty of the nation, and also on the President’s fiscal policy discretions. Expansion of the right of the executive branch to make transfers between sections of the budget, and even the abolishment of Constitutional ground for the parliament’s jurisdiction to make such transfers exhibit a serious risk on the power of the purse. Furthermore, the appointment of the Attorney General of the Audit Court (that also audits the Presidency on behalf of the Parliament) by the President and the limitation of his/her tenure by the President’s term of office, bring a “politization” risk for the audit of the budget. Another risk is that the President has nothing to do against the authority of the Budget Commission to make almost infinite changes on the Budget of the President, which is the main apparatus to apply his/her fiscal policy; because s(he) has no right to veto these changes.

Keywords

• presidential government system
• power of purse
• budget act