Self-reference and emotional reaction drive aesthetic judgment

Abstract

Abstract Traditional philosophical inquiry, and more recently neuroscientific studies, have investigated the sources of artworks' aesthetic appeal. A substantial effort has been made to isolate the objective features contributing to aesthetic appreciation. While variables such as contrast or symmetry have been shown to robustly impact aesthetic judgment, they only account for a small portion of the intersubjective variability in aesthetic ratings. Recent multiprocess model of aesthetic appreciation could accommodate this finding by proposing that evaluative processes based on self-reference underpin the idiosyncrasy of aesthetic judgment. We tested this hypothesis in two behavioral studies, that were basically conceptual replications of our previous work, in which we took advantage of the self-reference effect on memory. We also tried to disentangle the role of self-reference and emotional reaction to artworks in guiding aesthetic judgments, by comparing an aesthetic judgment encoding condition to a self-reference condition (Study 1), and an emotional evaluation condition (Study 2). We show that artworks encoded in an aesthetic judgment condition exhibit a similar mnesic advantage compared to both the self-reference and the emotional evaluation encoding conditions. Moreover, retrospective emotional judgment correlates with both self-reference and aesthetic judgments ratings. These results suggest that a basic mechanism, appraisal of self-relevance, could ground aesthetic judgments.