Friedrich Nietzsche: from the “self-overcoming of morality” to the morality of self-overcoming

Abstract

The article provides a search for an answer to the question of the relevance of Nietzsche’s criticism of morality, first and foremost, his concept of “self-overcoming of morality”. Within Nietzschean studies there is a widespread view that Nietzsche’s own moral pathos is in direct contradiction with his deconstruction of European values, and his call for sovereignty to “free spirits” stands in stark contrast to his criticism of the subject. Close analysis, however, shows that it is Nietzsche’s discovery of the heterogeneity of the subject that enables him not simply to reject European Christian morality, but to transcend it with his own “last morality” — the morality of self-overcoming. Its imperative is directed primarily towards philosophers of the future and is in fact not an imperative of obligation, but a retrospective suspicion against “desires of the heart”, against any “desirability” in the interpretation of the world and man. The Nietzschean morality of self-overcoming turns out to be a powerful tool in the struggle against ressentiment, the relevance of which can hardly be overestimated today.

Keywords

• criticism of morality
• christian morality
• nietzsche
• subject
• ressentiment
• критика морали
• христианская мораль
• ницше
• субъект