"The nature of things" and the range of administrative dispute

Abstract

Judicial full jurisdiction in administrative dispute does not disturb the principle of separation of powers: its objective is complete, effective, economic, and timely protection of subjective rights and interests. Firstly, it goes without saying that administrative jurisdiction is in principle protective-operational mechanism. At the same time public administration should do its job, and in everything legally and properly - not to hide behind the hypothetical complete intervention of the administrative judiciary (both judicial and administrative, in two steps). It is necessary to adopt general catalogue - in the form of legal position of the administrative court - of administrative matters that are exempted from full jurisdiction. Apart this, the Court reserves the right to assess when to engage in full jurisdiction and when not. De lege ferenda, Law on administrative disputes should not refer to the possibility that lex specialis laws exclude full jurisdiction in specific administrative matters. It should be the issue of discretionary powers. It is also legitimate to prevent ping pong in the field of administrative-judicial disputes. De lege ferenda, it would be necessary that after one cancellation of the contested administrative act (the same is the case when establishing that the silence was unfounded) and the non-compliance with that judgement, the court's full jurisdiction would be mandatory, regardless of the nature of the matter, except when there is an administrative discretionary assessment. Summa summarum, in the entire given milieu, the category of "nature of the things" is redundant, i.e. it represents unclear limiting factor of full jurisdiction.

Keywords

• administrative dispute
• nature of things
• full jurisdiction
• discretionary power