How Mitochondrial Signaling Games May Shape and Stabilize the Nuclear-Mitochondrial Symbiosis

Abstract

The eukaryotic lineage has enjoyed a long-term “stable” mutualism between nucleus and mitochondrion, since mitochondrial endosymbiosis began about 2 billion years ago. This mostly cooperative interaction has provided the basis for eukaryotic expansion and diversification, which has profoundly altered the forms of life on Earth. While we ignore the exact biochemical details of how the alpha-proteobacterial ancestor of mitochondria entered into endosymbiosis with a proto-eukaryote, in more general terms, we present a signaling games perspective of how the cooperative relationship became established, and has been maintained. While games are used to understand organismal evolution, information-asymmetric games at the molecular level promise novel insights into endosymbiosis. Using a previously devised biomolecular signaling games approach, we model a sender–receiver information asymmetric game, in which the informed mitochondrial sender signals and the uninformed nuclear receiver may take actions (involving for example apoptosis, senescence, regeneration and autophagy/mitophagy). The simulation shows that cellularization is a stabilizing mechanism for Pareto efficient sender/receiver strategic interaction. In stark contrast, the extracellular environment struggles to maintain efficient outcomes, as senders are indifferent to the effects of their signals upon the receiver. Our hypothesis has translational implications, such as in cellular therapy, as mitochondrial medicine matures. It also inspires speculative conjectures about how an analogous human–AI endosymbiosis may be engineered.

Keywords

• signaling game
• mitochondria
• endosymbiosis
• information asymmetry