U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign

Abstract

This article examines the U.S. response to global terrorism and its campaign in Afghanistan from 2001 to today. The aim of this article is first to understand the fallacies, missteps, and misunderstandings of the U.S. approach in Afghanistan. Second, the analysis evaluates the lessons learnt and some possible strategies for achieving long-term stability and security in Afghanistan. In particular, the analysis focuses on the different strategies adopted by the United States and their achievements. Despite a first victory over the Taliban regime, the initial approach was focused on the enemy only and it lacked long-term planning, paving the way to an insurgent movement against the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Then, in 2003 the U.S. strategy started to focus on the population, government institutions, and local support. This shift involved a significant change in tactics and operations and achieved positive results from 2003 to 2005. However, since 2005 the situation has deteriorated, casualties have increased and both the Taliban and al-Qaida have gathered strength. Despite the injection of new troops, the U.S. and coalition forces have not find a way to stabilize the country yet. The defeat of al-Qaida and the stability of Afghanistan are, therefore, far from being achieved.

Keywords

• Afghanistan
• Al-Qaida
• Counterinsurgency
• Counterterrorism
• Foreign policy
• Taliban