Éthique, droit pénal et déterminisme chez Twardowski

Abstract

This article focuses on Twardowski’s compatibilist determinism. Firstly, I explain what determinism is according to Twardowski and why he considers it a more probable position than indeterminism. Secondly, I present his analysis of the concept of imputation [poczytywanie], which echoes the so-called “character theory of excuses” and enables him to reconcile determinism and imputation. This analysis asserts that an act can be imputed (erroneously or deservedly) only if it emanates from the character of the agent. Thirdly, I summarize his analysis of the concept of responsibility. Finally, I show that Twardowski leans towards incompatiblism when remorse or feelings of responsibility are concerned but does not think that this should lead us to ethical scepticism. This article includes an appendix with a translation of a summary publication by Twardowski on this subject.