Research on decision-making behavior of stakeholders of low-carbon housing from the perspective of evolutionary game

Abstract

The government, real estate developers, and buyers are the three main bodies of low-carbon housing implementation. In this research, the evolutionary game theory is applied to explore the evolution law of each subject’s decision-making. The results show that the government’s absolute strategic support, low-carbon housing of real estate developers and buyers’ purchase of low-carbon housing are evolutionary stable strategy; Different initial strategy values will not affect the final evolution result of the system, but will affect the time when the system reaches the stable state; The government’s punishments to the real estate developers and the subsidies to the real estate developers and the house buyers do not affect the final strategy choice of the real estate developers and the house buyers, but affect the strategy evolution rate; Under the support of absolute strategy, the greater the cost of government investment, the longer the evolution time for homeowners and real estate developers to achieve stable strategy; When buyers and real estate developers have high willingness to implement low-carbon housing, the government will reduce the corresponding policy investment with the help of buyers and real estate developers.

Keywords

• Low-carbon housing
• Tripartite evolutionary game theory
• Evolutionary stable strategy
• Simulation analysis